I. Introduction
Age 51 is a bit early to be writing a retrospec tive about one's career as an economist and one's life. This is especially true for me since I am not on track to win a Nobel Prize, to be admitted to the National Academy of Science, or even to be elect I hope that a number of messages come through to you in this essay. They are that we all are prod ucts of our environment and experiences, that fam ily, friends, and students mean much more in the long-run than all of the publications on one's vita, that committing oneself to a single institution can be overwhelmingly satisfying, and that famous economists are not spared from adversity and must learn to cope with life's problems just as everyone else does. However, I am getting ahead of myself, so let's start at the beginning.
II. My Early Years
I was born in New York City in April of 1946.
The defining event of my early life occurred around age four when an uncle and aunt took me upstate to a lake for a weekend vacation. Without going into the details, which I vividly remember to this day, I almost drowned. When I regained con sciousness after being saved, someone told me I had almost died.
Out of this experience I developed a fear of death (which I fortunately later outgrew) and, since as a four-year-old I viewed death as the ultimate failure, a fear of failure. I became driven to avoid failure, and since unexpected events could always occur that might frustrate my efforts, everything I did had to be completed as soon as possible. This drive to quickly achieve things, was a major moti vating force for the first 40 years of my life. This drive was re-enforced by my being a first child and the only grandchild for five years on my mother's side of the family. The hopes and aspirations of my grandparents, parents, and four uncles and aunts all rested with me during those early years.
III. My School and College Years
I grew up in a Jewish family in which my par ents were both secondary school teachers. Their choice of occupation, made during the depression years, was motivated by a desire for financial secu rity as well as by the belief in the fundamental importance of education. They were hard-working people whose life revolved around work and fami ly; however, there was little discussion in our house of the social values that Judaism teaches that have shaped the careers of many other economists from Jewish backgrounds.
I benefited from what at the time may have well been the best public school system in the country, the New York City public schools. Public school teachers during the 1950s and early 1960s were drawn predominantly from the upper tail of the female talent distribution. They loved learning and they conveyed this love to their students. Educa tion was also seen as a vehicle for upward mobili ty. Bright students were not held back in the name of "equity." I remember one teacher giving me a present of a book written in French after I achieved a ninth grade reading level while in fourth grade?
she clearly felt I needed an additional challenge.
Sadly, I never achieved any facility in foreign Ian 
IV. Graduate School Years
Harpur College was not a household word in the mid 1960s and, given my basic insecurity about my abilities, I was not sure that I could "hack it" at the very best graduate programs in economics. So I crossed the top 5 off of my list and applied to the next 10. Fellowship money was readily available at all top institutions, thanks to the National Defense Education Act Fellowship program, which provid ed funding for three years, including summers, of PhD study. Many graduate programs in economics still required proficiency in one or two foreign lan guages to receive a PhD, but some had eliminated all language requirements and instead required pro ficiency in mathematics. Given my lack of lan guage ability, my decision rule for which graduate school to attend was simple: Choose the highest rated program among the set of programs that pro vided the most years of fellowship support and had no language requirement. On that basis, which had nothing to do with the economists on the faculty, I enrolled at Northwestern University.
Having made my decision based on absolutely no relevant information, I am happy to report that Northwestern was ex post a wonderful place to study economics. The faculty emphasized rigorous analytical training. Economic models were to be used to derive testable empirical implications and then the theory tested.
My dissertation addressed whether an increase in the overtime premium would be an effective way to reduce employers' usage of overtime hours and expand employment. It was, very much, a typical Northwestern dissertation for that time and had the following properties. First, a dynamic model of optimizing behavior was developed and equilibri um obtained using either the calculus of variations or optimal control theory. Next, comparative static or comparative dynamic analyses were conducted to derive testable propositions and careful econo metric estimation undertaken using "frontier" Second, while searching for a dissertation topic, Dale Mortensen suggested to me that I write to Robert Solow at MIT and ask for a copy of an unpublished paper of Solow's that Dale thought that I would find interesting. I did; Solow wrote back that he didn't have any spare copies (this was during the "stone age" and pre-copiers), but he sug gested that I might look at another topic that he thought would be interesting to think about. I fol lowed his advice and my dissertation resulted.
More importantly, I was touched that such a distin guished economist (later a Nobel Prize winner) would respond to a letter from a mere graduate stu dent at a much lesser institution. As a result, throughout my career I have tried to emulate Bob's behavior and I promptly respond to letters (and now email messages) from faculty and students from around the world, regardless of the stature of the institutions at which they are located.
Third, after I thought about Solow's topic for a while, which led me to a paper by Sherwin Rosen, perhaps the leading labor theorist of his generation, I developed an idea for a dissertation based on Rosen's paper and took it to one of the faculty members in the Northwestern department. He told me it wouldn't work. I was crushed, but since I had no other ideas, I continued to pursue the topic. My efforts led to an article in the American Economic Review, while I was still a graduate student, a dis sertation that I completed in four years, and ulti mately three other articles and two books. This experience taught me never to tell a student "it won't work" and I encourage students to pursue My pleas that I would prefer to go to a less com petitive and more teaching-oriented environment were not heard, and they made contacts for me at the very best departments. I wound up having to choose among positions at more than 10 different major research universities.
Graduate students today faced with a weak job market probably would think me very lucky. In fact, contrary to what we teach our students, more alternatives are not always better than fewer, espe cially if none of them are the type of job one really wanted. I hit an information overload and could not make a rational choice. Ultimately, I accepted a position at Berkeley but concluded several months later that I needed to take a year off to regroup and decide what I really wanted to do. I spent that year teaching at Loyola University of Chicago and wrote the equivalent of a second dissertation (with out any faculty advisors this time), which ultimate ly led to a second American Economic Review paper and another book.
Objectively, the faculty at Northwestern were trying to help me to get a position that, in their view, would be the best place for me to start my career.
Their evaluation of what would be "best", however, was based on the assumption that the "track" that they were on was the best one for me.
While I have wound up on that "track" myself, I never assume that my career path is best for all my graduate students and I never push them towards jobs that they don't really want. Many of them are now happily situated in the nonacademic sector and at "lesser" institutions. My career at Cornell has been a wonderful one. I have had the freedom to address a wide range of interesting policy-related problems at the federal, state and institutional levels and to think and write about fundamental issues that our society con fronts. I've been lucky to have a large number of wonderful colleagues and one, Bob Smith, and I wrote the first modern labor economics text book in the early 1980s. It is now in its 6th edition and is still the best-seller in its field. This book, which was designed specifically for our students at Cor nell and stresses the usefulness of labor market eco nomics for social policy analysis, has influenced the way that a generation of students think about labor market issues. This influence is the real reward for "nonprinciples" text book writers.
I The love and foundation of my life has been my wife, Randy, and our marriage has now passed the 30-year mark. In addition to love and support, I also get research ideas from her descriptions of the issues that she has faced as a teacher, a school prin cipal, and now an assistant superintendent of schools. We have co-authored three papers togeth er and I have also co-authored a paper with our older son. He is still angry at me because I put my name first on that paper and only first authors get the citations in the Social Science Citation Index. As I neared age 50 in 1995, the age at which my close friend Dan Hamermesh's research suggested that any economist's chance of continuing to pub lish in major economic journals is close to zero, it was natural for me to question the direction that my career would go.4 I had been teaching classes in, and doing research on, university behavior and the economics of higher education for over a decade. I had been active on Cornell University faculty/administrative committees dealing with economic issues, feeling that this was a way that I could use my professional expertise to repay Cor nell for all that it had done for both me and my fam ily. When I was asked to serve as Vice-President for Academic Programs, Planning and Budgeting at the University, I felt that I really had no choice but to accept. While I miss having the freedom to allo cate my time that comes with being a Professor, I am enjoying the opportunity to help guide this great institution through very difficult financial times.
VI. My Contributions to Economics5
Some labor economists have developed theoret ical models that now bear their names. Others have similarly derived econometric specifications that carry their names. Still others have developed important econometric methods that subsequently have been named after them. Examples that come quickly to mind here are the "Lazear" model of mandatory retirement, the "Mincer" earnings equa tion, and Jim Heckman's "Heckit" procedure to deal with sample selection bias. I, however, have neither a theoretical model, an empirical specifica tion, nor an econometric procedure named after me. Rather, my claim to "fame" is that I have spent a career conducting empirical analyses that have been designed to influence the public policy debate in a wide variety of labor market and educational areas. I also have devoted substantial effort to ana lyzing whether compensation policies are designed in a way that provides agents with incentives to perform in "desirable" manners and have been especially interested in whether such incentives exist in the public, nonprofit and regulated sectors of our economy.
My earliest strand of research, which continues up to this date, focused on analyzing the impact of social insurance programs and protective labor leg A second strand of my research has focused on public sector, nonprofit and regulated labor mar kets. Using models of consumer demand, including those that allowed for habit-formation (which I had learned about in graduate economic theory cours es), in 1973 I was the first economist to estimate systems of demand equations for employees in the public sector. The estimated wage elasticities that were derived from these equations provided esti mates of the "market constraints" that limit the wage demands of unionized public employees and thus provided support for allowing public employ ees the right to bargain over their wages.
The estimated responsiveness of public employ ment levels to grants from other levels of govern ment that I obtained from these models provided estimates of what has become known as the "dis placement" or "fiscal substitution" effects of feder al "public employment" programs?programs that provide funding to state and local governments to expand their employment levels Twenty years later, I used similar analytic frameworks to estimate how research universities react to changes in the number of graduate students for which the federal govern ment provides financial support and how local school districts react to changes in state aid for edu cation. In each of these cases, my interest was in
showing that institutional responses to changes in external funding are often quite different than the funders may have anticipated.
My interest in public sector, regulated and non profit labor markets led me to conduct studies of how institutions in the public sector influence labor market outcomes. In particular, I have analyzed whether having a professional city manager led to lower public sector wages and whether the effects of public sector unions on wages and productivity depended upon the structure of public sector bar gaining in the area. I also analyzed whether the sub stitution of different types of nurses in hospitals in response to changes in their relative wages depend ed upon whether the hospitals were public, private non-profits or private for-profits and, in a book written at the end of the 1970s, I analyzed how the structure of regulated industries influences the wages of workers in these industries. This latter study grew out of my participation in a regulatory case before the New York State Public Service Commission, and from this case I learned that the standards of "refereeing" in the "real world" when "big" dollars are at stake are often much stricter than those used by academic journals.
Economists tend to believe that "actors" in eco nomic systems respond to incentives. However, I
have always wanted to know if incentives actually are structured in ways to encourage actors to per form in ways that "principals" consider desirable and, if they are, whether such incentives have desired effects on behavior. As a result, I have looked local governments and analyzed whether incentives for "performance" could be inferred from the structure of compensation for city man agers, police chiefs and fire chiefs. Similarly, I ana lyzed whether the compensation of local building trade union leaders was related to the compensation gains that they won for their members. This latter study required me (actually a student of mine) to collect considerable data from union records, and throughout my career I have stressed to my stu dents that the best research often arises from people putting considerable effort into generating new data, or combining existing data from a wide vari ety of sources.
Since both my parents and my wife were involved in elementary and secondary education, it was natural that I should be interested in issues that arise in this sector. I have studied the compensation and mobility of school superintendents to see if there are incentives operating to encourage them to maximize the amount students learn and to serve as responsible fiscal managers.
I have also studied how sick leave provisions in teacher contracts influence teachers' absenteeism, students' absen teeism and students' test score performance. Both of these studies involved major data collection efforts and included surveys of local school dis tricts in New York State.
Concern for enhancing the public debate about affirmative action policies in teacher hiring recent ly led me to conduct several studies that analyzed whether the match of teachers and students by race, gender, and ethnicity had any effect on how much students learned or on teachers' attitudes towards their students.6 While others have often shied away from addressing such socially sensitive issues, I
have appreciated the freedom that tenured faculty at major research universities have to dispassion ately address controversial important social issues and continually have exercised this freedom.
As I began to get involved with faculty gover nance at Cornell, it was also natural for me to think about how my skills as an economist could enhance my participation on faculty committees. When Cor nell's financial aid costs began to rise at a rapid rate in the early 1980s, I developed a model of how a selective university should allocate a limited finan cial aid budget across different categories of accepted applicants, given a specified objective function, and then showed how one could estimate the parameters necessary to actually implement such a model. The model, which was nothing more than a simple discriminating monopsonist model, provided the intellectual underpinnings for what has since become known as "preferential packag ing" in the undergraduate financial aid community. Many universities now regularly estimate, for dif ferent groups of their accepted applicants, how sen sitive the decisions of admitted applicants to enroll are to the levels of financial aid provided and vary the package of grant and loan aid that they offer to individuals with identical levels of financial need.
My research on this subject was followed by stud ies of how colleges students' grades and graduation probabilities are influenced by their employment while in college, whether the high tuitions charged by selective private colleges and law schools are warranted in terms of the post graduate education al and labor market outcomes that they yield for their graduates, and whether African-American stu dents are better off if they attend Historically Black
Colleges or Universities (HBCUs) instead of other institutions of higher education.
My evolving interest in higher education led me to analyses of the academic labor market and how Vol. 43, No. 1 (Spring 1999)the types of financial support doctoral students receive for graduate school influences their com pletion probabilities and times to degree. I have also studied whether reductions in tenure probabil ities influence the salaries that universities must pay for faculty and analogously, how faculty salary levels affect their turnover probabilities. The latter study grew out of my service on the AAUP com mittee that annually collects data on faculty salaries from American colleges and universities and was another example of how I have combined service Finally, about a decade ago, Charles Clotfelter of Duke invited me to join him to work on a book on the economics of higher education. His invita tion is what firmly set me on the professional course that I am on today. We have also become close friends. The best part of being an academic economist is meeting people like Charlie. For as I said in the introduction, family, friends and stu dents mean much more in the long-run than all the publications on one's vita.
VIII. Postscript
I loved being a senior central administrator at Cornell. To paraphrase the words of James Freed man, one of the best parts of my job was that I was able to raise very fundamental issues with my col leagues in the administration and on the faculty and to force them to think about these issues. They did not always respond to these issues in the way that I personally would have preferred, but I had the sat isfaction of knowing that the University was seri ously thinking about these issues. My publica tions are grouped there both chronologically and by subject. 6. In an effort to get something named after me, throughout one of these papers I used the abbre viation RGE to refer to race, gender and ethnic ity effects. Sadly, to date, no one has caught on that these are my initials and the abbreviation is not yet widely used. 
